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Case No. 20150616-SC 
INTHE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff/ Appe llee, 
v. 
SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Replacement Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an interlocutory order denying his motion to 
enforce a plea agreement. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(b) (West 2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
A defendant has no constitutional right to be offered a plea bargain. 
And absent a guilty plea, any offer he does get has no constitutional 
significance, and the prosecutor may withdraw it at any time even if the 
defendant has "accepted" the offer. The court of appeals has recognized a 
narrow exception to this rule where the defendant relies on the offer to his 
detriment-say, by giving inculpating information or assistance to police in 
a way that cannot be undone. 
In this domestic violence case, defense counsel urged, and the State 
offered, a plea deal. The Saturday before a Monday trial, the defendant 
tentatively agreed to plead to a felony and drafted a proposal that she sent 
to the prosecutor for his approval and signature. Negotiations continued 
through Monday morning. Before the ple~ was signed by the parties or 
presented for the court's acceptance or rejection, the prosecutor withdrew 
the offer based on a conversation with the victim. Francis claimed 
detrimental reliance based on what he was willing to waive by pleading 
guilty and the hypothetical difficulty in getting a witness to appear at a 
continued trial. The trial court refused to enforce the parties' inchoate 
agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court correctly rule that the proposed plea bargain was 
unenforceable? 
Standard of Review. The enforceability of a plea agreement is a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 
13, ,110, 17 P.3d 1153. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are necessary to 
resolve this case, as it hinges entirely on case law. 
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Q 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 1 
Bethany C. lived with her boyfriend, Defendant Samuel Francis. 
R632. One night, Bethany and Francis were sitting on their porch with their 
mutual friend when Bethany and Francis began arguing. Id. During the 
argument, Francis grabbed Bethany's shoulder, pushed her against a wall, 
and headbutted her in the face three times. R634, 654-55. When the mutual 
friend tried to calm things down, Francis told him to II get the fuck out" 
because he was II going to beat the shit out of" Bethany. R637. 
After the friend left, Francis grabbed a butcher knife from the kitchen, 
held it to Bethany's throat, and threatened to kill her. R638. He then put 
the knife down and II full-on attacked" her, beating her head "into the 
ground," hitting it with a glass, choking her, and again threatening to kill 
her. R638-40. 
When the victim tried to call a friend for a ride, Francis threw her 
phone. R660-62. He then grabbed a security camera that recorded the 
incident and threw it to the ground in an attempt to break it. R641. 
1 Because this case is on interlocutory review, the State relies on the 
preliminary hearing, reciting the facts in the light 1nost favorable to the 
magistrate's bindover ruling. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 2015 UT 42, ,r2 n.2, 349 
P.3d 696 (holding that on interlocutory review, appellate courts "recount the 
facts as alleged and in a light most favorable to the ruling below."). 
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B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State· charged Francis with five counts, all domestic violence 
related: three counts of aggravated assault, third degree felonies; one count 
of obstruction of justice for breaking the camera; and one count of damage 
to a communication device. R84-86. The matter was set for jury trial on 
Monday, June 15, 2015. R310-12. 
During a pretrial conference on Friday June 12, defense counsel asked 
the prosecutor for a final plea offer. R318. The prosecutor replied that 
Francis could plead to a third degree felony without any agreement on 
sentencing. Id. Defense counsel replied that she would convey the offer, 
but Francis was unlikely to accept it. Id. 
On Saturday June 13, defense counsel asked the prosecutor over the 
phone if he would agree to a misdemeanor based on an alleged discovery 
issue; the prosecutor declined, and insisted on a felony. R320. After 
speaking with Francis, defense counsel emailed the prosecutor later that 
day, stating that he accepted the offer "'to plead to the 3rd degree felony, 
Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommended, stay 
silent at sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and complete 
recommended treatment, and restitution." R437. Defense counsel said she 




trial- and that she woul~ "draft the plea paperwork and send it to [the 
prosecutor] for [his] approval." Id. 
At 8:04 p.m. on Sunday the 14th, defense counsel emailed a proposed 
statement in advance of plea and told the prosecutor to let her ·"know if [he 
saw] any edits that need to be made." R443. 
At 7:25 a.m. on Monday the 15th, the prosecutor·emailed back, asking 
for two changes to the document, one substantive (agreement to a one-step 
reduction in offense level, likely after successful completion of probation 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402), one stylistic (remove the victim's name). 
Id. Before going to court, the prosecutor then spoke with the victim on the 
phone, who apparently disapproved of the resolution. R432. 
The prosecutor rescinded the offer less than an hour later shortly 
before the parties appeared in court. Id. When the trial court took the bench 
a few minutes later, defense counsel stated that she was "not ready to 
proceed to trial" because she had anticipated a resolution that day, and 
stated that she "would like to file a Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement" 
as well as another 0 Motion in Limine." R311, 321. The court requested that 
the parties "meet and confer about settlement" and an "exhibit in 
-5-
question" - likely referring to the motion in limine regarding an alleged 
discovery violation.2 R311. 
About forty-five minutes later, Francis rejected the State's plea offer-
presumably a different one-and requested to continue the trial. Id. The 
court granted the continuance and set a hearing date to allow the parties 
time to brief the plea bargain and discovery issues. Id. 
Francis filed two motions: (1) a motion to enforce the proposed plea 
agreement and (2) a motion to dismiss the case under State v. Tiedemann 
because by the time police learned of and collected video footage from 
Francis's surveillance cameras, it was recorded over. R317-27, R330-46. 
The trial court denied both motions after extensive argument. R691-
752. Regarding the plea agreement, the court ruled that the State could 
"rescind the offer" at any time before the court accepts the plea. R748. 
Francis timely sought interlocutory review only on the plea issue, which the 
court of appeals granted. R471-569, 588-89. The court of appeals then 
certified the case to this Court. See Appellate Docket, order of October 28, 
2016. 
2 Francis has not provided a copy of the transcript of this hearing, so 
the State takes its summary from the court minutes. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Analogizing to contract law, Francis argues that he is entitled to 
enforce the prosecutor's initial plea offer because the State made a "non-
conditional, definite, and complete" offer; he unconditionally accepted it; 
and he relied on it to his detriment. While some contract analogies are 
helpful in plea agreement cases, the acceptance-by-the-offeree analogy is 
not. For guilty pleas, only court acceptance of the guilty plea itself makes 
the plea agreement enforceable between the "contracting" parties. The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized this, holding that it is only the 
guilty plea-not the plea offer-that has constitutional significance. As the 
trial court correctly recognized, because Francis never pled guilty, his 
enforcement claim fails at the outset. 
Pre-plea agreements can be enforceable where a defendant relies to 
his detriment on a prosecutor's offer. But the reliance necessary to support 
pre-plea enforcement arises only where the defendant's performance 
materially undermines the fairness of a trial should the State back out of the 
plea deal; for example, where a defendant inculpates himself in a way that 
cannot be undone. 
That did not happen here. Instead, plea negotiations simply failed-
as they often do - and Francis was placed back in the position he was in 
-7-
before negotiations began. Nothing that happened during the plea 
negotiations will make his trial unfair. 
ARGUMENT 
I. . 
Francis is not entitled to enforce a plea agreement that the 
trial court never accepted, and he did not rely on to his 
detriment. 
Francis argues that the prosecutor "breach[ed]" a "plea agreement" 
when he withdrew his offer after Francis accepted it and relied on it. 
Aplt.Br. 9. But because Francis had yet to enter a plea, there was no 
enforceable agreement for the prosecutor to breach. And Francis did not 
detrimentally rely on the State's offer in the only legally relevant way-the 
offer did not require him to do anything and he did not do anything that 
would have irreparably and materially damaged his position at trial. 
A. There is no constitutional right to enforce a plea agreement 
pre-plea, and a defendant does not rely on an offer to his 
detriment if he can be returned to his pre-bargaining 
position. 
In the guilty plea context, contract analogies are helpful as far as they 
go. For example, as in the civil context, Verdi Energy Grp., Inc. v. Nelson, 
2014 UT App 101, if14, 326 P.3d 104, the burden of proving both the 
existence of a contract and a breach of that contract is on the proponent-
here, Francis. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 653 (Westlaw 2014); 5 Wayne R. 
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LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure§ 
21.l(d), 521-22 (3d ed. 2007). 
And though there is "no constitutional right to plea bargain," 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977), if a prosecutor chooses to 
offer one, and a defendant accepts it by pleading guilty, the parties 
"essentially" have an enforceable contract. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 
129, 137 (2009); see generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) 
(applying contract principles to plea bargains). Thus, when a defendant 
pleads guilty, the prosecutor's promise made to induce that plea "must be 
fulfilled." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. And when either party breaches the 
contract, the non-breaching party is entitled to relief. See id. at 262-63 
(leaving remedy determination to state courts); see, e.g., State v. Patience, 944 
P.2d 381, 387 (Utah App. 1997) (permitting State to withdraw from 
agreement where defendant has breached). 
But the contract analogy has "limits" because though plea agreements 
are "like contracts," they" are not contracts." Id. at 387 (citing United States v. 
Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1990) (second emphasis added)). In the 
usual civil case, an offer, acceptance, and exchange of promises can be 
sufficient to create a binding contract. But criminal plea agreements are 
different. "A· plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional 
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significance; in itself it is a mere executory agree1nent." Mabry v. Johnson, 
467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984), disapproved of on other grounds by Puckett, 556 U.S. at 
138 n.1; see also Executory, Black's Law Dictionary 611 (8th ed. 2004) ("Taking 
full effect at a future time''; "To be performed at a future time; yet to be 
completed."). This is so because plea agreements are "not simply a contract 
between two parties"; rather, they "implic~te[] the integrity of the criminal 
justice system and require[] courts to exercise judicial authority." United 
States v. McGovern, 822 F.2d 739, 743 (8th Cir. 1987). 
Unless and "until embodied in the judgment of a court," a plea 
agreement "does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other 
constitutionally protected interest," because the "Due Process clause is not a 
code of ethics for prosecutors; its concern is with the manner in which 
persons are deprived of their liberty." Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507, 511. And 
"trial courts are not required to accept plea agreements." State v. Montiel, 
2005 UT 48, ,I13, 122 P.3d 571 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. ll(e)); see also 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (recognizing that there is "no absolute right to 
have a guilty plea accepted" and that a "court may reject a plea in exercise 
of sound judicial discretion''); see also Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1996) (holding no binding contract where "trial judge never 
accepted the plea aggrement"). Therefore, a "defendant's acceptance of a 
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prosecutor's proposed plea bargain creates no constitutional right to have 
the bargain specifically enforced," State v. Vixamar, 687 So.2d 300, 301 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Mabn;, 467 U.S. at 507-08), and by necessary 
extension, no enforceable contract. 
For this reason, defendants cannot enforce an agreement where no 
plea is entered, let alone one that has never "submitted to the trial court for 
approval." Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ,I,15, 10, 13-15; State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 
1294, 1304-06 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) ( opining that defendant was 
not entitled to enforce plea agreement unless the prosecutor agreed to it 
before it was presented to the court), overruling on other grounds recognized by 
State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ilif 48-61, 262 P.3d 803. 
The vast majority of courts to address the question follow this general 
rule. See United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[E]ven if 
Papaleo had accepted the government's plea agreement offer, such an act, 
alone, would not have created a constitutional right to have that bargain 
enforced" given trial court discretion to reject plea bargain); United States v. 
Wessels, 12 F.3d 746, 752-53 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Savage, 978 
F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[N]either the defendant nor the 
government is bound by a plea agreement until it is approved by the 
court."); Harden v. State, 453 So.2d 550, 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("Until 
-11-
formal acceptance has occurred, the plea binds no one: not the defendant .. 
. , the prosecutor, ... , or the court.") (citing cases); State v. Crockett, 877 P.2d 
1077, 1079 (Nev. 1994) (same); State v. Willis, 933 P.2d 854, 858 (N.M. 1997) 
(same); State v. Trepanier, 600 A.2d 1311, 1315 (R.I. 1991) ("We believe that 
either the state or a defendant may withdraw from [a plea] agreement 
unless and until that defendant's plea is actually entered. Prior to that time 
such an agreement should not be enforceable against either party."); Reed v. 
Becka, 511 S.E.2d 396, 402 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999). (" A majority of courts 
addressing" this issue "have concluded that neither a defendant nor the 
government is bound by a. plea offer until it is approved by the court.") 
(citing cases); Metheny v. State, 589 S.W.2d 943, 945-46 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1979) (refusing to enforce plea agreement before plea accepted by court and 
holding no "irremediable prejudice" to the defendant); Ex parte Williams, 
637 S.W.2d 943,947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ("The 'contract' does not become 
operative until the court announces it will be bound by the plea bargain 
agreement."); State v. Bogart, 788 P.2d 14, 15-16 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) 
(same).3 
3 To the State's knowledge, only two states-Alabama and 
Maryland-enforce pre-plea agreements without irreparable detrimental 
reliance. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarber, 437 So.2d 1330, 1336 (Ala. 1983) 
(compelling State to re-make pre-plea offer, though not requiring trial court 
to· accept it); Rios v. State, 974 A.2d 366, 374-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) 
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This is true even where, as ·here, the State rescinded an "accepted" 
offer after consulting with the crime victim. See Miller III v. State, 1 So.3d 
1073, 1076-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (refusing to enforce agreement where 
defendant initially accepted State's offer but the State "soon thereafter" 
rescinded after speaking with the victim); Diggs v. State, 219 S.W.3d 654, 
658-60 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (refusing to enforce signed agreement between 
parties not presented to court where prosecutor withdrew offer after 
consulting victim). 
The court of appeals has recognized a narrow exception to this 
general rule for cases in which the defendant (1) acts in reliance on the 
agreement and (2) his actions "would substantially affect a retrial." State v. 
Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1027 (Utah App. 1996); Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ,I15 
("From the record before us, we find no evidence that defendants took any 
action in reliance on the tentative plea agreement, and therefore, they 
(holding plea agreement enforceable before acceptance by court). But their 
reasoning is unpersuasive. Most glaringly, they go against the United States 
Supreme Court's holding in Mabry that unaccepted pleas have no 
constitutional significance. MabnJ, 467 U.S. at 507, 511. They also appear to 
be attempts to enforce the very thing that MabnJ refused- best practices on 
prosecutor's offices. Id. This would violate the separation of powers. 
Further, the Maryland court's reasoning is arguably self-contradictory, 
because the court held the pre-plea offer enforceable even while recognizing 
that u An 'offer that requires a third party's approval before it becomes 
effective is no offer at all." Rios, 974 A.2d at 374. 
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suffered no prejudice by the trial court's unwillingness to compel the State 
to honor the agreement.") (citing Moss); see also Wayne R. LaFave et al., 5 
Crimin.al Procedure§ 21.2(£) (4th ed. Westlaw 2016) ("The prevailing doctrine 
is that ,.the State may withdraw from a plea bargain agreement at any time 
prior to, but not after, the actual entry of the guilty plea by the defendant or 
other action by him constituting detrimental reliance upon the agreement.") 
(citations omitted). 
In other words, if, relying on the plea offer, a defendant somehow 
inculpates himself in a way that cannot be undone, then he may force the 
State to live up to what it promised, even though the promise has yet to 
mature into a plea that a court has accepted. See Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, 
if 15 (holding no prejudice where defendant took no ,.,. action in reliance on 
the tentative plea agreement" and that reliance had to '" substantially affect 
retrial'") (quoting Moss, 921 P.2d at 1027). 
But situations meeting such an exception are rare. Stokes v. 
Armantrout, 851 F.2d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 1988) (Detrimental reliance is 
difficult to demonstrate in a plea bargain context."). So long as the 
defendant can be "placed in the same position as he or she was prior to the 
guilty plea, there is no undue prejudice to the defendant" when the 
government withdraws a plea offer after the defendant has accepted the 
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offer but before a court has accepted the plea. Moss, 921 P.2d at 1027 
(citations omitted); State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1982); see also Gov't of 
Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980) (refusing to compel plea 
agreement where defendant was "in the same position as if he had not been 
offered a plea"); United States v. McGovern, 822 F.2d 739, 744-46 (8th Cir. 
1987) (similar); Metheny, 589 S.W.2d at 945-46 (holding no "irremediable 
prejudice" to the defendant by placing him in pre-negotiation position). 
Indeed, this is true even if a trial court initially accepts a plea. Moss, 
921 P.2d at 1027-28. And mere disappointment in the loss of the bargain 
does not suffice. Chapman v. State, 426 S.E.2d 9, 11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding disappointment insufficient to constitute detrimental reliance); 
State v. Beckes, 300 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Wisc. App. 1980) ("[T]he due process 
clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not protect a defendant 
against shattered expectations."). 
Cases holding detrimental reliance generally involve cooperation 
agreements in which the defendant takes some action - such as tendering a 
confession, paying restitution, or aiding in a police sting operation-in 
order to earn a particular resolution. See generally State v. Terrazas, 2014 UT 
App 229, 336 P.3d 594 (discussing cooperation agreements); State v. Johnson, 
360 S.W.3d 104, 109-11 (Ark. 2010) (same); see, e.g., United States v. Wells, 211 
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F.3d 988 (6th Cir. 2000) (remanding for hearing on potential reliance where 
defendant arguably complied with cooperation agreement terms); People v. 
Fanger, 748 P.2d 1332, 1333 (Colo. App. 1987) (finding detrimental reliance 
where defendant gave incriminating statement and agreed to testify against 
his brother in exchange for plea deal); Doe v. Dist. Attorney, 564 N.E.2d 588, 
590-91 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991) (remanding for hearing on reliance where 
defendants agreed to participate in undercover operations); Moody v. State, 
716 So.2d 592, 595 (Miss. 1998) (citing cases holding detrimental reliance 
where defendants resigned from work position, tendered confession, or 
performed undercover activity to secure pleas); Custodio v. State, 644 S.E.2d 
36, 39 (S.C. 2007) (explaining that defendant may rely to his detriment on 
offer by "provid[ing] beneficial information to law enforcement"); Beckes, 
300 N.W.2d at 873 (citing cases explaining that defendant may rely to his 
detriment where he pays restitution or acts as an informer). 
But even then, if the evidence that a defendant gives is not used in 
later proceedings, he cannot be said to have relied to his detriment. See e.g., 
Hall v. Al Luebbers, 341 F.3d 706, 715-16 (8th Cir. 2003) (no detrimental 
reliance where defendant took polygraph but government did not seek to 
ad1nit it at trial); Evans v. State, 899 So.2d 890, 894-95 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding no detrimental reliance where defendant gave confession that was 
-16-
Q 
not admitted at later trial); State v. Marlow, 432 S.E.2d 275, 280-81 (N.C. 1993) 
(holding no detrimental reliance from defendant taking polygraph at State's 
request prior to plea bargain revocation where the State did not intend to 
use results in later proceedings). And the proposed plea itself cannot later 
prejudice the defendant because it is inadmissible at trial. State v. Pearson, 
818 P.2d 581, 582-83 (Utah App. 1991) (holding under rule 410, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, that plea negotiations are inadmissible by either party at trial). 
B. Francis cannot enforce a plea bargain where he never pied 
guilty, he was returned to his pre-bargaining position, the 
reliance he asserts is illusory, and the terms were never final 
at any rate. 
Francis argues that he is entitled to enforce the proposed plea below 
because the prosecutor made an "unconditional and definite" offer which 
he "unequivocal[ly]" accepted and relied on to his detriment. Aplt.Br. 16-
18. The trial court properly denied him relief. Even if the prosecutor had 
made a definite offer that Francis had unequivocally accepted, there was no 
enforceable plea agreement because the trial court had not accepted his 
plea. The reliance that Francis argues is not the kind that would justify 
enforcing a plea agreement on a plea that the court had yet to accept. And 
there was no definite offer or unequivocal acceptance at any rate-the 
precise agreement terms were still under negotiation. 
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Even if the parties had reached a "meeting of the minds'' - a point 
·which the State disputes below-there would still be no valid agreement 
because, as explained, "the tentative plea agreement was neither presented 
to nor accepted by the trial court." Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, if 15; see also 
Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507 (" A plea bargain standing alone is without 
constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement."). As 
Francis acknowledges, all of the cases he relies on-including Patience -
involved "enforcement of plea terms after a defendant has already entered, 
and the trial court accepted, a plea from the defendant." Aplt.Br. 13. But as 
shown, without a plea, there is no agreement to enforce. Stringham, 2001 UT 
App 13, if15 (refusing to enforce "tentative plea agreement" that "was 
neither presented to nor accepted by the trial court."). 
It is true-as Francis points out, Aplt.Br. 14-that the trial court in 
Stringham would have rejected the plea agreement because it did not 
address restitution. Id. But that fact did not determine the outcome; it 
merely further supported the court's holding. Id. Thus, contrary to 
Francis's argument, Aplt.Br. 14, the absence of evidence on whether the trial 
court was willing to accept the plea does not make the agreement on the 
unentered plea enforceable. It is merely a non-dispositive factual 





court had yet to accept the plea before the prosecutor revoked the offer-is 
the same in both cases. 
Francis also relies on State v. Bero for the proposition that "a 
constitutional right to enforcement of plea agreements may arise before a 
contract is reached because of reasonably formed expectations of the 
defendant." Aplt.Br. 15. But this statement in Bero was pure dicta, as Bero 
was not entitled to enforcement of his plea. Bero, 645 P.2d at 46-47. And 
that dicta-and the Fourth Circuit case it cited in support-have been 
overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Mabry, 467 U.S. at 506-07 
&n.2.4 
4 Bero cited Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979) for the 
hypothetical proposition that pre-plea agreements could be enforceable. 
645 P.2d at 47. Cooper was never very influential- almost every court that 
cited to it did so only to reject its reasoning. See, e.g., Scotland, 614 F.2d at 
364 (rejecting the "Cooper rule"); Caldwell v. State, 747 S.W.2d 99, 151-52 
(Ark. 1988) (declining to follow Cooper); Cope v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.2d 
703, 704 (Ky. 1983) (" Additionally, we would join those jurisdictions which 
have repudiated Cooper.") (citing cases); State v. Caminitta, 411 So.2d 13, 16 
(La. 1982) (" Cooper is the only case in any jurisdiction to so hold and we 
reject its rationale."); State v. Collins, 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (N.C. 1980) ("We 
reject the holding in Cooper and elect to follow the decisions in other 
jurisdictions" that the "State may withdraw from a plea bargain 
arrangement at any time prior to, but not after, the actual entry of the guilty 
plea") (citing cases); Beckes, 300 N.W.2d at 873 ("We do not find the fourth 
circuit's reasoning [in Cooper] persuasive."); cf Trepanier, 600 A.2d at 1315 
("We are persuaded by the opinions of those courts that have held that no 
enforceable agreement has been made until the plea is entered."). 
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Francis also argues that he relied on the offer to his detriment in four 
ways: (1) by "specifically for[going] the investigation and assertion of claims 
regarding alleged Brady and Tiedemann violations"; (2) by forgoing "his trial 
rights" because the State requested that the trial proceed with counsel 
allegedly unprepared; (3) "at least one witness" -the mutual friend-"who 
appeared at the trial on June 15 would be, according to Francis, unlikely to 
appear at any subsequent trial"; and (4) he must "pay the expert he retained 
in this case additional monies." Aplt.Br. 17-18. This purported reliance is 
not the kind that would justify enforcing an agreement on a plea that the 
court has yet to accept. That is, Francis has not shown that the plea 
negotiations irreversibly damaged his ability to defend himself. 
Francis did not "forgo" his Brady/ Tiedemann claims- they were fully 
briefed, argued, and decided against him. (R330-46, 353-430, 690-723). 
He was not forced to go to trial unprepared- as Francis admits, the 
trial court granted his motion for a continuance. Aplt.Br. 18, see also R310-
ll. And plea negotiations that began one business day before trial was 
·sut regardless of how influential Cooper was while it was good law 
in the Fourth Circuit, it was overturned by Mabry. See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 
506-07 & n.2 ( citing Cooper as reason for granting certiorari review and 
holding, contrary to Cooper, that a "plea bargain standing alone is without 
constitutional significance"); see also State v. O'Lean;, 517 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 
(N.H. 1986) (recognizing that Mabry overruled Cooper); Purser v. State, 902 
S.W.2d 641, 648 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (same, citing cases). 
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scheduled to begin could not have caused his counsel to be unprepared to 
go to trial one business day later. If counsel was unprepared, the plea 
negotiations were not at fault. 
As to the possible non-appearance of a witness at a hypothetical later 
trial, it is not the witness's choice whether to appear- if summoned, he 
must come or face contempt. Utah R. Crim. P. 14(a)(7) ("Failure to obey a 
subpoena without reasonable excuse may be deemed a contempt of the 
court responsible for its issuance."). And the witness was responsive to 
subpoena, because he appeared at the scheduled trial. Plea negotiations 
could not have caused Francis to relinquish access to such a witness. 
And Francis does not explain why he is "required to pay the expert 
he retained in this case additional monies." Aplt.Br. 18. It is certainly not 
because the expert was paid to testify, because there was no trial. Calling 
off a witness before they testified would seem at very least not cost 
additional money, and may save money. Thus, it is not clear how the plea 
offer could have caused whatever additional expenses that Francis will 
allegedly incur. Because Francis could be restored to his pre-offer position, 
he has not shown detrimental reliance. See Moss, 921 P.2d at 1027 (holding 
that where "the defendant is simply placed in the same position as he or she 
was prior to the guilty plea, there is no undue prejudice to the defendant.") 
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(citations omitted). As explained, a plea offer may be withdrawn or rejected 
at any time before a plea is entered. 
Francis further argues that the "State must abide by the terms of its 
agreement, despite the displeasure of the victim." Aplt.Br. 19. But the 
"displeasure of the victim" is the very sort of thing that trial courts are 
required to take into account when deciding whether to accept plea 
resolutions. See State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, ifif23-39, 44 P.3d 756 (discussing 
victim's rights under Utah constitution and statutes, and explaining that the 
victim was properly heard "at a time when he could have persuaded the 
court to reject the proposed plea"). This only further illustrates that any 
preliminary agreement with the prosecutor would not have bound the trial 
court. 
And more fundamentally, the record shows that the parties never 
reached a "meeting of the minds." Bero, 645 P.2d at 46 (holding no 
enforceable agreement where "there had been no meeting of the minds 
between counsel"). Francis's recitation of the proceedings below makes it 
appear as if the prosecutor made a single offer, which he accepted on its 
face. Id. at 16. But the record shows more extensive negotiation: 
* Defense counsel requested a final offer on June 12, three 
days before trial. The prosecutor offered a felony plea 





said she would convey the offer, but Francis was unlikely 
to accept it. R318. 
* On the 13th, defense counsel asked for a misdemeanor 
based on an alleged discovery issue, and the prosecutor 
refused, insisting on a felony. R320. 
* Later that day, defense counsel said that Francis agreed 
to plead to the obstruction of justice count as a felony, 
with various terrn.s and conditions, including a 24-month 
probation period, substance abuse evaluation and 
treatment, restitution, and for someone- presumably the 
prosecutor-to stay silent at sentencing on jail. R437. 
* In the late evening of the 14th, defense counsel sent a 
statement in advance of plea-not in the record-asking 
the prosecutor to let her know of "any edits that need to 
be made." R443. 
* On the morning of the 15th, the prosecutor responded, 
saying that he would only agree to a one-step reduction 
in offense level, likely following successful completion 
of probation. R443. 
* Before the parties signed the statement in advance of plea 
and presented it to the court for acceptance, the 
prosecutor revoked the off er. R432. 
Thus, the prosecutor had not made an "unconditional and definite 
offer" and Francis had not accepted any of the offers the prosecutor made. 
Rather, at the time the prosecutor revoked the offer he had made, the parties 
were still negotiating- and consequently had not reached agreement on-
the level of offense, the prosecutor's duties at sentencing, and what level of 
reduction Francis would be entitled to if he successfully completed 
probation. Francis hardly accepted the prosecutor's offers unconditionally; 
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rather, he made a series of counteroffers that nullified each successive offer. 
See generally Cal Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1377 
(1995) (" An offeree' s proposal of different terms from those of the offer 
constitutes a counteroffer, and no contract arises unless the original offeror 
accepts it unconditi_onally."). And he did not accept the prosecutor's latest 
offer before it was revoked. Because there was no "meeting of the minds" 
on the precise terms of the plea deal, no agreement was ever reached, even 
under a pure civil contract analogy. See, e.g., State v. Nine Thousand One 
Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213,216 (Utah App. 1990) ("However, 
if the parties to the agreement never reached a 'meeting of the minds,' there 
is no 'agreement' to be fulfilled."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on February 10, 2017. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
JOHN J. NIELSEN 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE UT AH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-Zl-
SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, . 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO ENFORCE 
PLEA AGREEMENT 
Case N!!.1319O8488 
The Honorable Royal Hansen 
COMPS Now Defendant, SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, and moves the court for an Order to 
enforce the plea agreement that was in place on June 13, 2015. This Motion is based on 
the following: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The State has charged Francis by Amended Information with five charges: three 
counts of third degree felony aggravated assault (DV), one count of third degree 
felony obstruclion of justice, and one count of class B misdemeanor interruption 
of a conununication device. 
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2. Francis was scheduled to have a three-day trial from June 15 through June i7, 
201.S. 
· 3. On Friday~ June 12, 2015, a final pre-h·ial conference was·held in this matter. 
DuriI1g thcit conference; the Court directed the parties to meet and confer ·. 
regarding jury instructions, voir dire, an~ any outstanding evidentiary is~ues. 
4. Later that Friday afternoon, Mr. ·Heiner on behalf of the State and Ms. Booth for 
Francis conducted a telephone conference at approximately 2:30pm. 
5. During that phone call, Booth said to Heiner, "One thing we did not do was put 
the final plea offer in this case on the record this morning at the final preh·ial 
conference. We will probably need to do that Monday morning. What is the final 
plea offer from the State in this case? I don't think we have talked about that ii1. 
some months since it appeared we were headed for b:ial." 
6. Heh1er responded," the offer is the same offer that has been out there for s01ne 
time: Aaron can plead to a third deg1;ee felony, 402 reduction after successful 
completion of probation, 24 months supervised probation, no a_greem~nt for 
recommendation of no jail at sentencing." 
7. Booth then responded, "so the 3F would ~e to the agg assault?" 
8. Heiner then replied, "no, I amok if he pleads to eithet the obstruction or the agg 
assault, but no agreement for jail recs." 
9. Booth.indicated she would relay the offer to her clieht, but that he would likely 
decline it because of the felony. 
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I. 
10. Heiner did not at any time during the discussion on June 12 indicate that the 
offer was·no a final offer, or that it contingent on upon notice to the victim. In 
fact, Heiner and Booth have had several conversations regarding plea resolutions 
in this matter, and counsel for the alleged victim was involved in those . 
discussions. 
11. Booth and Heiner then discussed the remaining evidentiary issues and 
completed the phone call. 
12. Because the State~ s offer was different than any other offers that had been 
extended in the case, and because the State's offer to plead to the obstruction 
charge with a dismissal of the aggravated assault charges, Booth contacted her 
client to relay and discuss the new offer. 
13. On Saturday, June 13, 2015, Booth emailed Heiner upon discovering an 
evidentiary issue, and requested Heiner contact her at his earliest convenience. 
14. Heiner called Booth shortly thereafter, and the two discussed the evidentiary 
issue (that is the subject of the Tiedema1m motion filed herewith). Heiner said he 
would call Booth back shortly. 
15. Heiner then forwarded an email to Booth with an attachment that contained new 
evidence in the case, and then Heiner called Booth within minutes of forwarding 
the email, at approximately 3:00pm. 
16. Heiner and Booth discussed the evidentiary issue, and Booth indicated to Heiner 
that she would likely need to file a Tiedemann motion and/ or motion in limine. 
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Exasperated at the 11th hour discovery issue, Booth said to Heiner," Are we 
r·eally going to try this case? Why don't we just resolve it?" And then Booth 
proposed that since there was a late discovery issue, that the State agree to 
resolve the case with a Class A misde~11eanor plea offer. 
17. Heiner declined, stating his reasons for not wanting to extend that offer, and 
said," Aaron [Fra!lcis] can plead to the third degree obstruction or assault, and 
earn a misdemeanor, but I am not going to agree to a misdemeanor." Booth ~en 
said she would get back to Heiner about the issues they had discussed. 
18. Booth then discussed the evidentiary_ issues and plea offer with Francis, and at 
4:30pm, Booth en~ailed Heiner and indicated that Francis had accepted the 
State's offer, and that Booth would email the Statement of Defendant in Advance 
of Plea to Heiner for his approval. 
19. Booth then emailed the Statement of Defendant to Heiner, and sent him a text 
message conforming the same and indicating that Booth would meet with 
Francis at 8am Monday morning to review the Statement and prepare to enter 
the plea at 8:15am when the Judge took the bench. 
20. Heiner emailed Booth Monday morning at 7:25am with minor edits to the 
Statement of Defendant. 
21. When Booth walked into the courh·oom Monday morning just before 8:15a1n, 
Heiner walked up to Booth and said, "No go, Bethany won't sign off on the 









22. Booth inquired about what Heiner was talking about, and indicated that at no 
time had Heiner ever told Booth that the offer was not final, and that it was 
contingent upon any acceptance or approval by the alleged victim. 
23. Heiner said, "sorry, I just can't do it." at which point Booth ·indicated she didn't 
have any files and was :not prepared to go forward with trial in light of the fad: 
that they had a plea deal. 
24. Unbeknownst to Booth, Heiner contacted the alleged victim on Saturday to 
inform her that Francis had accepted a plea offer, but was not able to reach her 
until Monday morning by phone. 
25. Booth knew at the time Heiner extended the new plea offer on Friday, June 12, 
that the victim had no legal right to preclude the plea offer from being made or 
prevent the Court from accepting the plea offer. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
The State breached its agreement with Francis and now the Court must 
compel the Government to honor the resolution. 
"In interpreting a plea agreement, we rely on general principles of contract law, United 
States v. Cn.chucha, 484 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007), and therefore look to the express 
language in the agreem.ent to identify both the nature of the govenunent's promise and 
the defendant's reasonable understanding of this promise at the time of the enhy of the 
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guilty plea 11 VnnDmn, 493 F.3d at 1199. We consl:rue any ambiguities against the 
government as.the drafter of the agreement.. Cachucha, 484 F.3d at 1270."1 
And in Scmtobello v. New York, the s.upreme Court recognized the importance for a 
prosecutor to act fairly when negotiating and securing deals with an accused. 2 And in 
United States v. Greene, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that, "Where a plea is predicated in 
any significant degree on a promise or agreement, such promise or agreement must be 
fulfilled to maintain the integrity of the plea."3 The Tenth Circuit then further held, 
"General principles of contract law govern the prosecution's obligations under a plea 
agreement." 4 To determine whether a breach has occurred, courts apply a two-step 
p1:ocess: (1) "we examine the nature of the government's promise;" and (2) "we evaluate 
this promise in light of the defendant's reasonable understanding of the promise ... " 5 
The defendant rieed only prove the underlying facts establishing the breach by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 6 
In applying the two-part test for determining whether the State is breaching the June 
13 plea agreement, the Court can examine the nature of the State's agreement for 
1 United St;:ites v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2008). 
2 San.tobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
3 United States v. Greene, No. 06-5063 (FED10) 08/16/2007 (Citing, United States v. 
Greenwood, 812 F.2d 632,637 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 
512, 516 (iOth Cir. 1986)). See also, United.Stntes v. Werner, 317 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Sa1Ztobello, 404 U.S. 
at 262). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Wemer, 317 F.3d at 1171; Btye, 146 F.3d at 1210 (citing United Slates v. Rockwell Int'l 










Francis to plead ~o a felony obsh·uction of justice charge, and then evaluate that 
agreement in light of Francis' understand~1g of the plea agreement, i.ndudi~g his . 
reasonable reliance thereon. 
In this case, the State, for the first time in the case on June 12, 2015, offered to dismiss 
the aggravated assau~t charges in exchange for Francis' plea to obshuction of justice as a 
domestic violence offense, third degree felony. The State's offer was unequivocal. And 
Francis' acceptance of that offer on June 13, 2015 was also unequivocal. And, Francis 
relied on that agreement with the State when he ceased h·ial preparation, called off his 
witnesses, and forfeited his retainer to the expert witness in this case. Yet, the State 
breached that agreement on Monday by erroneously stating that the plea agreement 
was somehow voided because the alleged victim did not assent. 
Francis agreed to waive his constitutional rights in exchange for the State disni.issin.g 
the felony aggravated assault c~arges and the interference with a conununication 
device charge. Francis has strong trial defenses, but agreed to waive those defenses and 
his r!ghts for purpose of avoiding the possibility of being convicted for an aggravated 
assault, which significantly limit his future educational and employment opportunities. 
The State's offer, as relayed by Heiner, was not conditional, and in fact was made as a 
statement of the final offer for the parties to put on the record. That fact demonsh·ates 
that the State's offer was not conditional, and that Francis' reliance was reasonable. 
Relying upon this agreement and other representations of the State, Francis forewent 
pursuing his h"ial defenses in light of the plea agreement. Because it was clear during 
the June 12 and 13 conversations that the offer was made and not conditional, the plea 
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agreeinent was now enforceable. In the subsequent communications, including the 
email sent by Heiner Monday morning at 7:25am containing edits to the Statement of 
Defendant memorializing the plea agreement, all indicators were that the plea would be 
entered imminently. 
Applying the general principles of conh·ad law to the agreement between the State 
and Francis, both parties will benefit from their bargained-for ·agreem~nt with the. 
government's registering a conviction, procuring the probation conditions and 
b-eatment of Francis, and closing one more matter on the State's caseload. Francis is 
entitled to the benefit of his agreement with the State. 
Further, the plea agreement is not void or voidable because the victim does not like 
the resolution. Utah's victim's rights statutes do not allow for an alleged victim to void 
a plea agreement. 7 hl fact, the provisions of Utah's victim's rights statutes explicitly 
state that the rights of victims shall not be construed to provide a legal basis for 
interference with a plea. 8 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, having the reasonable understanding that in 
exchange for his plea as charged to Count Four of the Amended Information, a thfrd 
degree felony to obstruction of justice (DV), his case will be resolved in a manner 
favorable to both parties, respectfully moves the court to enforce said agreement, and 
7 Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37-1, et seq., and 77-38-1, et seq. 









require that the State honor the resolution that Francis negotiated with Heiner, and 
accepted prior to tdal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of June, 2015. 
KELLYlNN. BOOTH . 
..-: 1'1.1.C 
Attorney for Aaron Francis 
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SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case N!! 131908488 
The Honorable Royal Hansen 
THIS COURT, HAVING CONSIDERED the Defendant's Motion, and based on relevant law 
and good ·cause appearing, hereby ORDERS: 
'" The Defendant' S Motion is GRANTED. Defendant' S case should resolve as tl1e 
parties agreed. 
DATED this_· _ day of June, 2015. 
The Honorable Royal Hansen 
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· SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Clint Heiner, Bar No. 11209 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (385) 468-7600 
Email: cheiner(@.sJco.org 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
ENFORCE THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
Case No. 131908488 
Honorable ROYAL HANSEN 
The State by and through counsel, Clint Heiner, moves this Cowt to deny Defendant's 
Motion to Enforce the Plea Agr~ement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Between June 12 and 13, 2015, the State and Counsel for Defense engaged in plea 
· negotiation discussions. Those discussions concluded with a statement by Defense Counsel that 
"Aaron can not accept any felony because he has a no felony policy at work." So, whe~ on June 
13, 2015, Counsel for Defendant sent the State an email tentatively accepting a felony offer 
(Attachenu1t A), the State was surprised. Counsel for the State then emailed the Victim and 
asked her for her number. On June 14, 2015, the State received another email from Counsel for 
Defense with an attached proposed plea for review (Attachement B). On June 14, 2015, the 
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State received a returned email from the Victim with her phone number; however, the state did 
not call her until the following morning, because of the late hour. On the morning of June 15, 
2015, the State looked at the tentative plea and sent an email to Defense Counsel (Attachemnt 
C). The State then called and spoke with the Victim. After discussing the tentative plea with the 
Victim, the State rescinded its offer to Defendant in Court at about 8:15 am when Counsel for 
Defense appeared. The tentative plea agreement was never finalized. Counsel for Defense had 
not made the changes proposed by the State. Counsel for Defense had not reviewed the plea 
wit~ Defendant and neither party had signed the plea. Furthermore, the plea was never presented 
to nor accepted by the trial court. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
In this case, Defendant relys upon contract law principles to seek specific performance of 
the tentative plea agreement. However, although principles of contract law provide a useful 
framework involving plea agreements they cannot be blindly incorporated into the criminal law 
area of plea bargaining. See Patience, 944 P.2d 381,387 (quoting tJ11ited States v. Oca11as, 628 
F.2d 353, 35~ (5th Cir. 1980)). Fm1hermore, Defendant attempts to apply the wrong legal 
standards to the issue at hand. Defense references cases where an agreement has been finalized 
and the court has entered and accepted the plea. The case most directly on point is State v. 
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13 (2001). In Stringham, before tr~al, defendants' counsel and the 
State discussed a potential plea agreement. The plea agreement, however, was never finalized 
between the parties, no.rwas it submitted to the trial court for approval. Defendant filed a motion 
to enforce the propoS.ed plea agreement, which was denied. In Stringham, the Court of Appeals, 
recognized the Utah Supreme Court's holding in. State v. Kay, stating "plea agreements are 






binding on the parties and the court once the plea is entered and accepted." State v. Kay. 717 
P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986). 
Here, both counsel for the State and Defense discussed a tenative plea agreement. 
However, that plea was never finalized; through email comnnmications between Counsel for the 
State and Defense: ( 1) Defendant had yet to make final confirmation of the plea, (2) Defendant 
had not reviewed the plea, and (3) the plea itself had not been finalized and edits still had to be 
made. Even assuming that the plea was finalized, the State rescinded the offer before it was 
accepted and entered on the record. Until the plea agreement was entered and accepted by the 
Court, the State is not bound by the offer. The State can rescind the offer up to the point the 
Court accepts and enters the plea on the record, so long as defendant took no action that would 
cause prejudice. (Strinuhamat 1157, citing State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1027 (Utah Ct. app. 
1996). Defendant cannot show prejudice. "[A] plea bargain standing alone is without 
constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which until embodied in the 
judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally · 
protected interest." (Strin!!ham quoting Mabry v. Jolmson, 467 U.S. 504 at 507 (1984)). The 
State presented ready for trial on June 15, 2015. This case has been pending for nearly 2 years, 
Defendant has waived his speedy trial rights a number of occasions and did so again on June 15, 
2015. Any prejudice to this point is speculative and Defendant cannot show any real prejudice. 
Furthermore, the ~tringhani Cotu1 noted,. "[i]n additional to being an executory 
agreement, the decision whether to accept or reject a plea agreement lies within the discretion of 
the trial court." (quoting State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Furthermore, 
"even where 'the government and the defendant reach a plea agreement, the court is not required 
to accept it." (Stringham quoting, United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316,325 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
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Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states, "[a]t the time of entry of plea, the 
prosecutor shall represent to the court, either in writing or on the record, that the victim has been 
contacted and an explanation of the plea bargain has been provided to the victim ... prior to the 
court's acceptance of the plea." U.R.C.P. 35 
Here, even if the State and Defendant would have moved forward with the plea, the Court 
by rule could have rejected it. Pdor to the State rescinding the offer, the Victim had not been 
contacted and the State had. not explained the plea bargain to her. Defendant could not 
guarantee that the Comt would accept and enter the plea of record and should have been 
prepared to go to trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The tentative plea offer was not final. Even if the plea was final; the State could rescind 
the offer where Defendant suffered no actual prejudice. Therefore, there is no plea to enforce. 
Furthennore, the tentative plea agreement was neither presented to nor accepted by the trial 
cotu1. Accordingly Defendant's motion should be denied. 












CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing STATE'S MOTION TO 
PRECLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY, was sent to the following: 
Ke~ly Ann _Booth [ ] U.S. Mail 
Attorney for Defendant [ ] Messenger/Hand Delivery 
8 East Broadway, Suite 700 [ ] Facsimile 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 [ ] email 
kellyann@boothlegal.com fxl eFile 
DATED this 30 June 2015. 


















Kelly Ann Booth <kellyann@boothlegal.com> 
Saturday, June 13, 2015 4:31 PM 
Clint Heiner 
Re: Samuel Aaron Francis 
Clint: I am waiting on final confirmation from Aaron, but he is accepting the plea offer you made yesterday for him to 
plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommend, stay silent at 
sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and complete recommended treatment, and restitution. 
Because of the new information we learned yesterday and today, and the new offer to plead to obstruction, my 
assessment is that if we can't prevail on a teidemann motion/motion in timine/motion to continue based on the new 
information we learned yesterday and today, and we have to go forward to trial without the video, the better option is 
to plead to the new offer. 
let's plan on doing that Monday morning, and 11II draft the plea paperwork and send it to you for your approval. see you 
Monday. Kelly Ann 
Kelly Ann Booth, Esq. 
The Judge Building. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 364.6666 Telephone 
(801) 618.3835 Facsimile 
PRIVILEGE STATEMENT-The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential information intended 
only for the use of the individual or entity named above, and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the 
intended recipient, the employee, or the agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are hereby 
notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received 
this communication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone (801-364-6666), and delete the original 
message. Thank you. 
Any communication or offer of settlement contained in this electronic mail message is subject to Rule 408 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is subject to the limitations thereof. 
Sent from my i?hone 




> Clint Heiner 
> Deputy District Attorney 
> Office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney 
> 111 East Broadway, Suite 400<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0> Salt Lake 
> City, UT 84111<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0> 
> 
> 801-363-7900<tel:801-363-7900> 




> CONFIDENTIAL: This electronic message - along with any/all attachments 
> - is confidential. This message is intended only for the use of the 
> addressee. If you are not the intended recipient or the person 
> responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you may not use, 
> disseminate, distribute or copy this communication. If you have 
> received this message in error, please immediately notify the sender 
> by reply electronic mail and delete the original message. Thank you 
> 
> 
> Begin forwarded message: 
> 
> From: 11 Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org» 
> To: '"Kelly Ann Booth 111 
> <kellyann@boothlegal.com<mailto:kellyann@boothlegai.com» 
> Cc: "Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org>> 
> Subject: FW: Samuel Aaron Francis 
> 
> Here is the most up-to-date police report 
> 
> 52 pages. I attached a copy of the report and the CAD Call 
> 
> <13-140510.pdf> 















Kelly Ann Booth <kellyann@boothlegal.com> 
Sunday, June 14, 2015 8:04 PM 
Clint Heiner 
Krystal Bain; Justin Knell 
Re: Samuel Aaron Francis 
SIAP _Francis_20150615.pdf 
Clint: Here is the Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea for the obstruction charge. I included all the terms you 
indicated on Friday, so it should be good to go. I will be at court in the morning at 8am to review it with Aaron, so we will 
be ready to go to enter the plea when Judge Hansen takes he bench at 8:15. Let me know if you see any edits that need 
to be made, otherwise, see you in the morning. Thanks, Kelly Ann 
From: Kelly Ann Booth 
Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2015 4:31 PM 
To: Clint Heiner 
Subject: Re: Samuel Aaron Francis 
Clint: I am waiting on final confirmation from Aaron, but he is accepting the plea offer you .made yesterday for him to 
plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommend, stay silent at 
sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and complete recommended treatment, and restitution. 
Because of the new information we learned yesterday and today, and the new offer to plead to obstruction, my 
assessment is that if we can't prevail on a teidemann motion/motion in limine/motion to continue based on the new 
inform.ation we learned yesterday and today, and we have to go forward to trial without the video, the better option is 
to plead to the new offer. 
let's plan on doing that Monday morning, and I'll draft the plea paperwork and send it to you for your approval. see you 
Monday. Kelly Ann 
Kelly Ann Booth, Esq. 
The Judge Building 
8 East Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 364.6666 Telephone 
(801) 618.3835 Facsimile 
PRIVILEGE STATEMENT - The information contained in this electronic mall message is confidential information intended 
only for the use of the individual or entity named above, and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the 
intended recipient, the employee, or the agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are hereby 
notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received 
this communication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone (801-364-6666), and delete the original 
message. Thank you. 
Any communication or offer of settlement contained in this electronic mail message is subject to Rule 408 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is subject to the limitations thereof. 











> Clint Heiner 
> Deputy District Attorney 
> Office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney 
> 111 East Broadway, Suite 400<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0> Salt Lake 
> City, UT 84111<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0> 
> 
> 801-363-7900<tel:801-363-7900> 
> 801-366-4176<tel:801-366-4176> (fax} 
> 
~ > CONFIDENTIAL: This electronic message - along with anyiali attachments 
> - is confidential. Thi~ message is intended only for the use of the 
> addressee. If you are not the intended recipient or the person 
> responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you may not use, 
> disseminate, distribute or copy this communication. If you have . 
> received this message in error, please immediately notify the sender 
~ > by reply electronic mail and delete the original message. Thank you 
> 
> 
> Begin forwarded message: 
> 
> From: "Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org» 
> To: "'Kelly Ann Booth'" 
> <kellyann@boothlegal.com<mailto:kellyann@boothlegal.com» 
> Cc: "Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org» 
> Subject: FW: Samuel Aaron Francis 
> 
> Here is the most up-to-date police report 
> 
> 52 pages. I attached a copy of the report and the CAD Call 
> 
> <13-140510.pdf> 



















Monday, June 15, 2015 7:25 AM 
'Kelly Ann Booth' 
RE: Samuel Aaron Francis 
(iJ) It is only a 1 step reduction. Also, take alleged victim out of statement. 
-----Original Message-----
From: Kelly Ann Booth [mailto:kellyann@boothlegal.com] 
Sent: Sunday, June 14, 2015 8:04 PM 
To: Clint Heiner 
Cc: Krystal Bain; Justin Knell 
Subject: Re: Samuel Aaron Francis 
Clint: Here is the Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea for the obstruction charge. I included all the terms you 
indicated on Friday, so it should be good to go. I will be at court in the morning at 8am to review it with Aaron, so we will 
be ready to go to enter the plea when Judge Hansen takes he bench at 8:15. Let me know if you see any edits that need 
to be made, otherwise, see you in the morning. Thanks, Kelly Ann 
From: Kelly Ann Booth 
Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2015 4:31 PM 
To: Clint Heiner 
Subject: Re: Samuel Aaron Francis 
Clint: I am waiting on final confirmation from Aaron, but he is accepting the plea offer you made yesterday for him to 
plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommend, stay silent at 
sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and complete recommended treatment, and restitution. 
Because of the new information we learned yesterday and today, and the new offer to plead to obstruction, my 
assessment is that if we can't prevail on a teidemann motion/motion in limine/motion to continue based on the new 
information we learned yesterday and today, and we have to go forward to trial without the video, the better option is 
to plead to the new offer. 
let's plan on doing that Monday morning, and I'll draft the plea paperwork and send it to you for your approval. see you 
Monday. Kelly Ann 
Kelly Ann Booth, Esq. 
The Judge Building 
8 East Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 364.6666 Telephone 
(801) 618.3835 Facsimile 
PRIVILEGE STATEMENT-The information contained in this electronic mail message ls confidential information intended 
only for the use of the individual or entity named above, and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the 
intended recipient, the employee, or the agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are hereby 
notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received 
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this com17:1unication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone (801-364-6666), and delete the original 
message. Thank you. 
Any communication or offer of settlement contained in this electronic mail message is subject to Rule 408 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is subject to the limitations thereof. 
Sent from my iPhone 




> Clint Heiner 
> Deputy District Attorney 
> Office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney 
> 111 East Broadway, Suite 400<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0> Salt Lake 
> City, UT 8411l<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0> 
> 
> 801-363-7900<tel:801-363-7900> 
> 801-366-4176<tel:801-366-4176> (fax) 
> 
> CONFlqENTIAL: This electronic message - along with any/all attachments 
~ - is confidential. This message is intended only for the use of the 
> addressee. If you are not the intended recipient or the person 
> responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you may not use, 
> disseminate, distribute or copy this communication. If you have 
> received this message in error, please immediately notify the sender 
> by reply electronic mail and delete the original message. Thank you 
> 
> 
> Begin forwarded message: 
> 
> From: "Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org» 
> To: "'Kelly Ann Booth 111 
· > <kellyann@boothlegal.com<mailto:kellyann@boothlegal.com» 
> Cc: "Clint Heiner11 <CHeiner@slco.org<maHto:CHeiner@slco.org» 
> Subject: FW: Samuel Aaron Francis 
> 
> Here is the most up-to-date police report 
> 
> 52 pages. I attached a copy of the report and the CAD Call 
> 
> <13-140510.pdf> 









KELLY ANN 1300TH (10910) 
kellyann@boothlegal.com 
THE JUDGE BUILDING 
8 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 700 
SALTLAKECITY, UTAH84111-2225 
(801) 364-6666 PHONE 
(801) 618-3835 FACSlMILE 
A.ttoruey for Defendant 
IN THE UT AH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-




MOTION TO ENFORCE 
PLEA AGREEMENT 
Case N! 131908488 
The Honorable Royal Hansen 
. Co~rns Now Defendant, SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, and files this Memorandum Further 
Supporting Defenda.nt' s Motion to. Enforce Plea Agreement. 
RESPONSE TO ST A TE' S ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
1. "Between June 12 and 13, 2015, the State and Counsel for Defense engaged in. 
plea negotiation discussions. Those discussions concluded with a statement by Defense 
Counsel that 11Aaron can not (sic) accept any felony because he has a no felony policy at 
work." 
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a. Response: The State and Francis did not II engage in plea negotiation 
discussions/' Francis told the State that they had failed to place the final : 
plea offe~ on the record at the final pre-trial that morning, a11d needed to 
do that at rrial Monday morning. Francis then inquired what the State's 
final offer was, and the.State extended a new offer that included dismissal 
· · .. of all the Aggravated Assault felony charges. Francis' s counsel did reply 
that she did not believe Aaron would accept the offer because he has a no 
felony policy at worki however, Francis' counsel clearly indicated to the 
State that, since there was a new offer that in~luded dismissal of the 
Aggravated Assault charges, she was ethically obligated to convey the 
offer to Francis and would get back to the State with his answer. The State 
did not indicate at any time that the offer was tei1tative, or subject to 
approval by anyone. That was the State's final stated plea offer, the one 
that the parties "should have" put the r~cord in open court as the final 
plea offer to Francis for him to accept or reject. 
2. "So, when on June 13, 2015, Counsel for Defendant sent the State an email 
tentatively accepting a felony offer (Attachemnt (sic) A), the State was surprised." 
a. Response: While Francis does not dispute that the State was surprised, the 
email accepting the offer was not tentative. It read in relevant part, "he is 
accepting the plea offer you made yesterday for him to plead to the 3rd 






recommend, stay silent at sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval an.d 
complete recommended treahnent, and restitution .. .let's plan on doing· 
that Monday mon1ing, and I'll draft the plea paperwork and send it to 
· you for your approval." 1 Despite ample opportunity to hit "reply" to 
Francis' email, at no time did the State respond to Frnncis and indicate 
that he needed to get approval from anyone, or that he had not notified 
the alleged victim in this case. In fact, when the State did reply to the 
subsequent email from Francis containing the Statement of Defendant in 
Advance of Plea, the State's only response was to make minor edits to the 
document. 
3. "Counsel for the State then emailed the Victim and asked her for her number." 
a. Response: The State could have emailed Francis if it had concerns that the 
plea offer had not been discussed with the alleged victim. It was clear 
from Francis' email that the offer was accepted and that Francis was 
anticipating entering the plea on Monday morning. It was also clear from 
Francis' acceptance email that the basis for the acceptance of the plea was 
to avoid asserting and litigating certain defenses and evidentiary issues 
that had been brought to light on June 13, and that Francis was actually 
foregoing his defenses and claims in order to take advantage of the new 
1 Email from Booth to Heiner dated June 13, 2015 at 4:31pm (a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A). 
~3~ 
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plea offer. These facts demonsh·ate there was likely a duty at that point for 
the State to inform Francis that it viewed the offer as "tentative," if it did, 
in fact, view it as such at that point. 
4. "On June 14, 2015, the State received another email from Counsel for Defense 
with an attached proposed plea for review (Attachement (sic) B)." 
a. Response: The attached Statement in Advance of Plea outlined all the 
terms of the plea agreement, as offered by the State and accepted by 
Francis. Despite confirmation in that email that the plea was accepted by 
Francis, and an actual document created in performance of the agreement, 
the State still did not respond to that email and indicate that the plea offer 
was "tentative" or conditional. 
5. "On June 14, 2015, the State received a returned email from the Victim with her 
phone number; however, the state (sic) did not call her until the following 
morning, because of the late hour." 
a. Response: None. 
6. "On the morning of June 15, 2015, the Stat~ looked at the tentative plea and sent 
an email to Defense Counsel (Attachenmt (sic) C)." 
a. Response: The State's email made minor edits to the plea agreement, and 
again did not indicate in any way that the plea was "tentative" or that the 
parties Ii1ay not enter the plea that morning. 
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C:, ~ 
7 .. "The State then called and spoke with the Victim. After discuss~1g the tentative 
plea· with the Victim, the State rescinded its offer to Defendant in Court at about 
8:15am when Counsel for Defense appeared." 
a. Response: Other than disputing thatthe plea was "tentative", no further 
response. 
8. "The tentative plea agreement was never finalized. Counsel for Defense had not 
made the changes proposed by the State." 
a. Response: Counsel did make the changes by interl:ineation to the 
Agreement since they were minor edlts, and not substantive changes. TI1e 
plea agreement was finalized on June 13 when Francis accepted the State's 
unequivocal offer, and relied on that agreement when he forewent 
investiga~on and assertion of evidentiary claims and defenses, as well as 
his trial rights. 
9. "Counsel for Defense had not reviewed the plea with Defendant and neither 
party had signed the plea. Furthermore, the plea was never presented to nor 
accepted by the trial court." 
a. Response: Counsel had absolutely reviewed the plea agreement with 
Francis, and the State is correct that no one had signed the agree~nent yet, 
because the State unilaterally breached the agreement and rescinded its 




Disposition. of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process, but a 
highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most 
criminal cases ... This phase of the process· of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element 
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant 
what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will van;, but a constant 
factor is tlrnt whelz a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or considerati.on, such promise 
must be fulfilled.Z 
I. US and Utah caselaw indicates that the Court should apply contract law 
principles in determining where there was an enforceable agreement 
between the State ancl Francis. 
"Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, 
have referred to plea agreements as contract and have applied principles from contract 
law to plea agreements." 3 The Utah Supreme Court has articulated specifically, 
[t]he nature of plea bargains requires the exchange of consideration, allowing the-
parties involved to reach a mutually desirable agreement. A plea bargain is a 
contractual relationship in which consideration is passed.4 
The State correctly quoted the Court of Appeals in Patience when it stated, 
"[h]owever, although principles of contract law provide a useful framework involving 
plea agreements they ca~ot be blindly incorporated into the criminal law area of plea 
2 Santobello v. New Yorlc, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971). 
3 State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,386 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 













bargaining."5 Yet it failed to include the immediately following sentences in that 
paragraph whichmake clear that the application of contract law principles should be 
more broadly applied in the plea bargahi context, not more narrowly as the State 
suggests. Patience goes on to hold, 
In applying contract law principles to plea agreements, courts must keep in 1nind 
that the defendant's underlying contract right is constitutionally based and 
therefore reflects concerns that differ fundamentally from and run wider th.art 
those of commercial contract law. As a result, the application of contract law 
principles to plea agreements may require tempering in some instances. For 
example, in interpreting plea agreements or determining their validity, court 
may in certain circumstances hold the government to.a higher standard than the 
defendant. 6 
TI1e central holding in Patience was that the State could not rely on strict application of 
contract law principles to deny the defendant her due process rights or invalid her plea 
agreement in its entirety. The State in that case was seeking to set aside her entire plea 
and require the defendant to face h:ial on the charges anew where she was seeking 
specific performance under the agreement. This holding stands for the opposition 
proposition than the State suggests, and further undermines its argument to invalidate 
its plea agreement. 
5 State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Enforce The Plea Agreement at 2. 




· The C6urt' s holding in Patience is premised upon the Utah line of cases interpreting 
. . 
the United States Supreme Court's holdings regarding plea: agreements in Santobello 7 
and Mnbry. 8 Accordingly, "[a] defendant may also be entitled to enforcement of his or 
her plea agreement on the basis of a reasonably formed expectation,"9 including specific 
performance. IO 
Thus, the Court should apply contTact law principles broadly to the facts of this plea 
agreement, and find that the State made a definite plea offer, that was unequivocally 
accepted by Francis, and he relied upon that agreement (consideration) in foregoing 
some defenses and evidentiary claims. 
A. The State's plea offer was not ntentative," it was definite in its tenns and 
communicated with.out caveat or condition. 
The State's definite, final plea offer was extended to ·Francis on June 12, when Heinei-
told Booth, "Aaron can plead to a third degi-ee felony, 402 reduction after successful 
completion of probation, 24 months supervised probation, no agreement for 
recommendation of no jail at sentencing." The State does not directly dispute that fact, 
but rather alleges that the State and Francis engaged in "plea negotiation discussions." 
Yet that is simply incorrect. The State's offer was a specific response to Francis' 
7 Snntobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
8 Mnbry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984). 
9 State v. Nine'Thousand One Hundred Ninety~One Dollars, 791 P.2d 213 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). 









statement that the parties had failed to place _on the record the final offer in this case, to 
meet the requirements of Missouri v. Frye. That the State provided its last plea offer iI1 · 
the case is evidence that the parties were not engaged in plea negotiations. 
·The plea offer from the State was clear, unconditional, specific, and complete in 
its terms. Tne State does not dispute that the offer, as stated by Francis in his 
memorandum, was made. Francis' counsel clearly indicated to the State that, since there 
was a new offer that included dismissal of the Aggravated Assault charges, she was 
ethically obligated to convey the offer to Francis and would get back to the State with 
his answer. 
In fact, Francis did respond to the State not more than 24 hours later, with a clear 
acceptance of the offer. Francis' cow1sel said, "he is accepting the plea offer you made 
yesterday for him to plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obsb·uction of Justice-DV, with 24 
month probation recommend, stay silent at sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and 
complete recommended treatment, and restitution."11 
Accordingly, because the State's plea offer was unconditional and definite, and 
Francis' acceptance was unequivocal, the Court must enforce the agreement if it 
determines there was consideration or reliance upon the agreement by Francis; 
prejudicial. 
B. F1·ancis relied upon tlte plea agreement and was p1·ejudiced by the State's 
improper rescission. 
11 Email from Booth to Heiner dated June 13, 2015 at 4:31pm (a copy of which is 
attached.hereto as Exhibit B). 
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TI1e State's argument that it can rescind its offer up to the point the Court accepts and 
enters the plea on the record is inconect, and not bas.ed on Utah or Federal Court 
authority. In fact, under Utah law, "[a] defendant may also be entitled to enforcem.ent of 
his or her plea agreement on the basis of a reasonably formed expectation,"12 including 
specific performance.13 And, "courts will generally only allow the State to unilaterally 
rescind a plea agreement by showing that facts analogous to those warranting a 1nistrial 
exist or by showing that the defendant has breached the agreement.1114 
In this case, Francis specifically forewent the investigation and assertion of 
claims regarding alleged Brady and Teidemnnn violations. Francis also forewent his trial 
rights inasmuch as he presented himself on the day of h·ial without the benefit of 
counsel whom could provide effective assistance; F1·ancis' counsel did not have any files 
or trial materials necessary to present a trial defense because the State induced Francis 
and his counsel to stop their trial preparations, call off wib.1esses, and forego claii:ns and 
defenses relating to evidentiary issues discovered on June 13. 
The prejudiced is further demonstrated by the State's objection to Francis' 
request to continue trial in light of the State's breached plea agreement. The State 
specifically sought to have Francis go forward without the benefit of effective assistance 
12 State v. Nine Thousand 011.e Hundred NinehJ-One Dollars, 791 P.2d 213 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). 
13 State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1984). 







of counsel caused by the inducement of the State to enter the plea agreement. That the 
Court did not grant the State's request does not alleviate the prejudice suffered by 
Francis. 
Moreover, at least one witness who appeared at the trial on June 15 is likely to 
fail to appear at any subsequent trial in this matter. Robert Packer stated to Francis' 
counsel in the hallway on the morning of h·ial that he "did not want to be here" and did 
not think he was II going to come back." The prejudice to Francis is clear. The witness 
appeared on the day of trial for which, but for the State's actions, would have gone 
forward and the wih1ess could have testified. Further, Francis is now in a position 
where he is required to pay the expert he retained in this case additional monies 
because of the State's actions; Dr. Beall was called off when the plea agreement was 
reached on June 13. And, again, the State prejudiced Francis by insisting on going 
forward to trial that morning. 
Had the Cow·t had the benefit of the briefing on June 15, and a fair appraisal of 
the facts regarding the plea agreement and subsequent breach, the Court would have 
enforced the agreement, finding that Francis would be prejudiced by going forward 
after reliance on the State's agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, SAMUEL AAR(?N FRANCIS, having the reasonable uhderstanding that in 
exchange for his plea as charged to Count Four of the Amended Information, a third 
degree felony to obstruction of justice (DV), his case will be resolved in a manner 
--11,..,, 
00457 
favorable to both parties, respectfully moves the court to enforce sai4 agreement, and 
require that the State honor the resolution that Francis negotiated with Hejner, and 
accepted prior to. h·ial. 
RESPECT~ULLY SUBMITTED this 7Lh day of July, 2015. 
KELLYCXNN I~ BOOTH 
~l rt.LC 











Kelly Ann Booth 
Saturday, June 13, 2015 4:31 PM 
Clint Heiner 
Re: Samuel Aaron Francis 
·Clint: 1 am waiting on final confirmation from Aaron, but he is accepting the plea offer you made y1;sterday f~r him to 
plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommend, stay silent at 
sentencing on jail, substa_r,ce abuse eval and complete recommended treatment, and restitution. 
Because of the new information we learned yesterday and today, and the new offer to plead to obstruction, my 
assessment is that if we can't prevail on a teidemann motion/motion in limine/motion to continue based on the new 
information we learned yesterday and today, and we have to go forward to trial without the video, the better option is 
to plead to the new offer. 
let's plan on doing that Monday morning, and I'll draft the plea paperwork and send it to you for your approval. see you 
Monday. Kelly Ann 
Kelly Ann Booth, Esq. 
The Judge Building 
8 East Broadway,. Suite 700 
Salt Lake 'city, UtaM 84111 
{801) 364.6666 Telephone 
(801) 618.3835 Facsimile 
PRIVILEGE STATEMENT -The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential information intended 
only for the use of the individual or entity named above, and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the 
intended recipient, the employee, or the agent responsible to deliver itto the intended recipient, you are hereby 
notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received 
this communication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone (801-364-6666), and delete the original 
message. Thank you. · · 
Any communication or offer of settlement contained in this electronic mail message is subject to Rule 408 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is subject to the limitations thereof. 
Sent from my iPhone 
. . . 




> Clint Heiner 
> Deputy District Attorney 
> Office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney 
> 111 East Broadway, Suite 400<x-app.le-data-detectors://4/0> Salt Lake 
> City, UT 84111<l<-apple-data-detectors://4/0> 
> 
> 801·363-7900<tel:801-363-7900> 
> 801-366-4176<tel:801-366-4176> (fax) 
> 











> - is confidential. This message is intended only for the use of the 
> addressee. If you are not the intended recipient or the person 
> responsible to deliver it to the intende~ recipient, you may not use, 
> disseminate, distribute or copy this communication. If you have 
> received this message in error, please immediately notify the sender 
> by reply electronic mail and delete the original message. Thank you 
> 
> 
> Begin forwarded message: 
> 
> From: "Clint Heiner'' <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org» 
> To: '"Kelly Ann Booth"' 
> <kellyann@boothlegal.com<mailto:kellyann@boothlegal.com» 
> Cc: "Clint Heiner' <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org» 
> Subject: FW: Samuel Aaron Francis 
> 
> Here is the most up-to-date police report 
> 
> 52 pages. I attached a copy of the report and the CAD Ca II 
> 
~ > <13-140510.pdf>. 
> <CAD call 13-140510.pdf> 
2 
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CERTIFICATE of SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 7th day of July, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was served. by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Salt Lake Disb·ict Attorney 
Justice Division Broadway 
111 E Broadway Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
,_, 13 ~ 
D Hand Delivery 
0 U.S. Mail 































tempering goes in favor of the State. 
in favor of the defendant. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MS. BOOTH: Thank you, Judge. 
It says the tempering goes 
THE COURT: I appreciate your help. Let's see, Counsel, 
with regard to the motion to enforce the plea agreement, the 
Court's not in a position to grant that motion, and in fact 
rejects it, finding that the plea had not been accepted by the 
Court in this circumstance. 
The plea had not been entered of record. The victim 
had not been consulted with regard to a potential plea, and the 
Tiedemann motion had not been heard at that juncture, that as I 
look at the State has the ability to rescind an offer before it's 
accepted and enter a record. Here it was not accepted by the 
Court or entered of record, either one. 
The plea agreement the State's not bound by that 
until there is an acceptance. The State can rescind the offer up 
and to the point that the Court accepts the offer and enters the 
plea of record, neither of which took place here. Based upon 
that, the Court's not able to enforce the plea agreement, and so 
I think we're in the position of getting this matter -- are we 
ready for trial? Is that what you' re telling me, Counsel, on the 
case and going forward? 
MR. HEINER: Yes, Judge. I believe we have a pie-trial 
in front of Judge Shaughnessy the week prior to trial. I don't 
-59-
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